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Ambiguous	interventions:	Capacity	remuneration	mechanisms	and	the	
politics	of	energy	transition	in	Britain	and	Germany	
	
Dr	Ronan	Bolton1	and	Dr	Thies	Clausen2	
Abstract	
This	paper	analyses	the	introduction	of	capacity	remuneration	mechanisms	(CRMs)	in	
Europe,	focusing	on	Britain	and	Germany.	We	show	how	CRMs	in	these	countries	are	
evolving	from	government	interventions	to	deal	with	electricity	system	reliability	to	become	
important	policy	instruments	designed	address	a	wider	range	of	economic	and	societal	
challenges	related	to	decarbonisation.	We	pay	particular	attention	to	the	ambiguous	role	
that	CRMs	play	as	tools	for	governing	the	decarbonisation	of	electricity	systems.	On	the	one	
hand	they	are	being	legitimised	by	governments	as	a	means	of	facilitating	the	integration	of	
renewables,	while	at	the	same	time	they	are	seen	by	many	actors	as	a	contributor	to	carbon	
lock-in	and	a	means	of	prolonging	the	fossil-fuel	industry.	We	discuss	key	factors	shaping	
the	ambiguous	role	of	CRMs	in	electricity	system	decarbonisation	and	their	relation	to	the	
politics	of	sustainability	transitions.	
Keywords:	Electricity	Markets;	Capacity	Remuneration	Mechanisms;	Socio-technical	
Systems;	Sustainability	Transitions;	Energy	Politics	
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1 Introduction	
This	paper	develops	a	socio-political	analysis	of	electricity	markets	and	low	carbon	
transitions,	focusing	on	a	particularly	contentious	issue	in	the	current	policy	debate	in	
Europe;	the	introduction	of	capacity	remuneration	mechanisms	(CRMs).	A	CRM,	broadly	
defined,	is	‘a	measure	taken	by	a	state	designed	to	support	investment	to	fill	an	expected	
capacity	gap	and	ensure	security	of	supply’	(Hawker	et	al.,	2017).	While	much	of	the	
literature	on	CRMs	has	focused	on	economic	questions	and	their	role	in	delivering	electricity	
system	reliability,	in	the	context	of	decarbonisation	they	are	becoming	important	policy	
instruments	to	address	a	wide	range	of	economic	and	societal	challenges	related	to	energy	
transitions.		
CRMs	are	ambiguities	interventions,	in	the	sense	that	they	can	be	viewed	simultaneously	by	
different	actors	as	enabling	and	constraining	decarbonisation.	On	the	one	hand	they	are	
being	legitimised	by	governments	as	a	means	of	maintaining	reliability	of	electricity	systems	
whilst	facilitating	the	integration	of	renewables,	and	at	the	same	time	they	are	seen	by	
many	actors,	in	particular	NGOs	and	renewables	industry	lobby	groups,	as	resulting	in	
payments	to	‘uneconomic’	coal	and	gas	thermal	power	plants,	in	effect	subsidising	the	
fossil-fuel	industry.	With	a	focus	on	Britain	and	Germany	in	recent	years,	the	paper	analyses	
how	the	politics	of	electricity	market	reform	has	been	shaped	around	the	ambiguities	of	
CRMs	as	actors	argue	pro	and	con	their	introduction	and	debate	their	design	features.	
The	dilemma	around	the	need	for	CRMs	is	particularly	interesting	from	an	energy	and	
climate	policy	perspective	because,	unlike	the	forms	of	government	intervention	such	as	
renewables	support	and	carbon	pricing	policies,	intentions	around	CRMs	are	often	difficult	
to	discern.	In	many	ways	they	don’t	fit	neatly	into	the	dominant	strands	of	thinking	about	
policy	design	for	energy	decarbonisation	which	often	frame	the	transition	as	a	battle	
between	the	old	and	the	new,	between	the	incumbents	and	new	entrants	etc.	CRMs	rather	
sit	at	the	interface	of	old	and	new	energy	regimes	and	there	are	significant	ambiguities	and	
uncertainties	around	basic	questions,	such	as	whether	they	are	needed	in	the	first	place,	
their	design	features,	whether	they	constrain	or	enable	decarbonisation	and	their	long-term	
effects	on	investment	and	electricity	system	transformation3.		
Britain	and	Germany,	our	case	studies,	are	two	leading	countries	in	the	low-carbon	
transition,	each	having	undertaken	to	reduce	greenhouse	gas	emissions	to	a	level	of	at	least	
80%	below	1990	levels	by	2050.	As	they	seek	to	decarbonise	their	electricity	systems,	both	
countries	have	recently	introduced	CRMs	but	with	different	outcomes	in	terms	of	how	they	
should	be	designed	and	implemented,	thus	providing	an	insight	into	the	different	ways	in	
which	decision	making	about	CRMs	and	electricity	market	design	choices	are	being	made	in	
the	context	of	transition.	The	British	case	outlines	the	lead	up	to	the	government’s	decision	
to	introduce	a	capacity	market	for	the	integrated	market	of	Scotland	and	England/Wales,	
commencing	in	2014.	This	is	contrasted	with	the	German	federal	government’s	decision	in	
2016	to	opt	for	a	more	targeted	approach	which	only	provides	payments	to	selected	
capacity	providers	which	do	not	participate	in	the	main	energy-only	market	–	a	strategic	
reserve.	
																																																						
3	Meadowcroft	(2011)	makes	a	similar	point	about	ambiguous	technologies,	such	as	CCS,	arguing	that	it	can	be	
difficult	to	categorise	certain	technologies	ex-ante	as	facilitating	system	change	or	perpetuating	fossil	fuel	lock-
in.	
In	the	next	section	of	the	paper	we	begin	by	providing	a	basic	introduction	to	CRMs.	This	
draws	mainly	from	the	energy	economics	literature	as	there	has	been	very	little	research	on	
the	subject	in	the	wider	energy	social	science	field	(for	an	exception	see	(Leiren	et	al.,	
2019)).	We	introduce	and	explain	key	terms	and	review	the	main	economic	arguments	
behind	CRMs	which	played	a	role	in	the	the	decisions	made	in	Britain	and	Germany,	
particularly	about	the	need	for	a	capacity	market	versus	a	more	targeted	strategic	reserve.	
Following	this	section,	we	develop	the	case	studies	of	Britain	and	Germany.	These	are	based	
on	an	analysis	of	electricity	market	reform	policy	documents	and	associated	technical	
studies,	along	with	12	semi-structured	interviews	with	energy	industry	experts	and	civil	
servants4.	In	line	with	emerging	research	on	energy	markets	from	a	wider	socio-political	
perspective	(Webb	and	Hawkey,	2017,	Bolton	et	al.,	2016,	Pallesen,	2016,	Breslau,	2013,	
Jenle,	2015),	we	show	how	economic	arguments	about	CRMs	in	each	case	needed	to	align	
with	political	interests,	a	process	which	played	out	in	quite	different	ways	in	our	two	cases.	
Following	the	main	empirical	section,	in	section	4	we	identify	and	discuss	two	key	
ambiguities	around	CRMs	which	have	framed	the	politics	of	market	design	for	low	carbon	
transition	in	each	case:	Firstly,	how	the	economic	and	energy	security	justification	for	a	CRM	
is	made,	and	secondly,	which	forms	of	capacity	are	deemed	eligible,	or	not,	for	payments.	In	
this	discussion	we	draw	from	EU	Commission	appraisals	of	the	British	and	German	CRMs	to	
supplement	the	country-level	evidence.	In	the	final	section	we	summarise	the	key	
arguments	of	the	paper	and	offer	some	concluding	remarks.		
2 A	brief	introduction	to	the	economics	of	electricity	and	CRMs	
As	it	is	costly	to	store	electricity	a	central	electricity	market	design	challenge	is	the	need	to	
have	a	capacity	margin5	in	place.	The	question	of	the	size	of	the	capacity	margin	and	how	to	
value	capacity	which	will	only	be	utilised	for	short	peak	demand	periods	has	been	a	central	
one	in	the	electricity	industry	since	its	inception	in	the	19th	century	(Hughes,	1983,	
Yakubovich	et	al.,	2005).	It	is	not	the	commodity	itself	–	the	use	value6	of	units	of	electrical	
power	for	practical	purposes	such	as	lighting	and	heating	–	which	is	valued	in	this	case,	
rather	the	capacity	to	meet	demand	when	called	upon.	How	to	value	this	additional	
capacity	which	has	a	collective	benefit	to	all	users	of	an	electricity	system	involves	difficult	
judgements,	firstly	about	the	the	amount	of	additional	capacity	to	have	on	an	electricity	
system	and	who	should	take	responsibility	for	it	being	in	place	–	government	or	the	
electricity	industry?	Secondly,	about	how	it	should	be	paid	for,	i.e.	how	the	costs	are	spread	
amongst	different	users	of	the	electricity	system	–	producers,	large	and	small	consumers	
etc.	
The	economic	policy	literature	on	how	to	deal	with	this	problem	is,	unsurprisingly,	vast	(for	
recent	overviews	see:	Keppler,	2017,	Pollitt	and	Chyong,	2018,	Höschle,	2018).	One	view	
held	amongst	some	economists	posits	that	no	dedicated	revenue	stream	for	capacity	
providers	is	required	to	deliver	long-term	system	adequacy;	rather,	the	‘energy-only	market’	
(EOM)	is	sufficient.	While	price	formation	in	wholesale	markets	is	typically	on	the	basis	of	
the	day-ahead	timeframe,	there	is,	the	argument	goes,	significant	scope	for	generators	to	
cover	their	capital	costs	from	returns	in	these	short-term	markets.	Conventional	‘spot’	
																																																						
4	6	interviews	in	Britain	and	5	in	Germany	
5	Defined	as	‘the	proportion	by	which	the	total	expected	available	electricity	generation	exceeds	the	maximum	
expected	level	of	demand	at	the	time	at	which	that	demand	occurs’	(House	of	Lords,	2015:	p.23)	
6	Defined	by	Aspers	and	Beckert	(2011)	as	‘what	is	gained	from	the	qualities	of	a	good	through	its	use’	(p.	12)	
markets	have	been	designed	around	the	notion	of	marginal	cost	pricing;	the	most	expensive	
generators	in	the	market	sets	the	system	price	which	all	generators	are	paid.	The	most	
efficient	generators	whose	costs	are	below	those	of	the	marginal	plant	can	therefore	earn	
‘infra-marginal	rent’,	whilst	highly	flexible	peaking	plant	can	earn	additional	‘scarcity	rents’	
during	periods	when	the	market	fails	to	clear,	resulting	in	market	prices	often	well	above	
marginal	costs.	EOM	proponents	argue	that	if	prices	are	not	artificially	capped	and	can	raise	
to	the	level	that	customers	would	be	willing	to	pay	not	be	disconnected	–	the	value	of	loss	
load	(VOLL)	–	both	variable	and	fixed	costs	involved	with	generating	electricity	can	be	
covered	and	hence	the	free	market	can	deliver	an	efficiently	sized	capacity	margin.		
A	number	of	key	problems	have	been	identified	with	this	ideal	EOM-based	model	however.	
In	the	event	of	a	shortage	of	supply	in	the	market	–	a	period	when	scarcity	rents	might	be	
available	to	generators	–	calculating	the	economic	value	of	electricity	supplies	to	customers,	
and	hence	the	market	price	which	reflects	scarcity,	is	constrained.	While	certain	customers	
may	be	willing	to	change	their	decisions	about	consumption,	for	example	by	switching	off	
their	machines	and	appliances,	and	others	may	be	willing	to	pay	extremely	high	prices	to	
maintain	their	supplies,	the	ability	to	calculate	marginal	costs	at	the	demand	side	is	severely	
constrained	because	of	technical	limitations;	i.e.,	the	absence	of	real-time	metering	in	many	
premises	and	the	inability	to	direct	power	flows	to	individual	customers.	Due	to	these	
‘demand-side	flaws’	in	the	electricity	markets	(Stoft,	2002)	severe	constraints	are	placed	on	
the	flow	of	information	about	the	preferences	of	market	participants	during	these	crucial	
periods	when	scarcity	rents	could	be	earned,	and	as	a	result	the	standard	economic	
framework	for	valuation	based	on	marginal	prices	breaks	down.		
In	the	absence	of	information	about	consumer	preferences	during	scarcity	periods,	an	
approach	taken	by	electricity	system	planners	has	been	to	set	an	administered	VOLL	which	
can	then	be	used	as	a	basis	for	calculating	the	socially	optimal	size	of	the	capacity	margin	
and	the	levels	of	payments	to	providers	of	the	necessary	capacity7.	In	theory	therefore,	a	
price	cap	set	at	or	above	the	VOLL	would	enable	peaking	plant	to	earn	scarcity	rents	and	
cover	their	costs.	However,	practice	in	many	markets	is	not	so	clear	cut.		
A	key	argument	against	the	EOM	logic	is	that	extreme	price	spikes	which	would	be	
necessary	to	reflect	the	scarcity	in	the	market	are	politically	unsustainable	as,	in	the	face	of	
pressure	from	voters	and	consumer	groups,	governments	are	likely	to	intervene	and	
introduce	a	price	cap	below	the	VOLL	for	political	expediency.	Another	source	of	uncertainty	
is	the	likelihood	of	intervention	by	the	system	operator	(SO)	–	the	body	responsible	for	the	
technical	stability	of	the	system.	SOs	are	understandably	risk	averse	and	are	unlikely	to	
allow	the	market	participants	to	resolve	system	imbalances,	particularly	over	short	
timeframes	(Joskow,	2008).	They	will	override	the	markets	in	the	interests	of	technical	
stability	and	may	have	large	amounts	of	capacity	purchased	via	bilateral	contracts	and	held	
as	reserves	which	can	be	released	into	the	market	during	scarcity	periods,	resulting	in	
depressed	prices	for	market	participants.	Another	concern	is	that	during	a	scarcity	period	it	
is	extremely	difficult	to	retrospectively	evaluate	whether	the	market	has	been	manipulated,	
for	example	by	a	large	generator	holding	back	supply	to	raise	the	price,	thus	creating	doubts	
for	governments	and	regulators	about	the	efficiency	of	free	markets.		
																																																						
7	A	useful	summary	of	VOLL	and	its	calculation	is	provided	here:	http://fsr.eui.eu/the-value-of-lost-load/	
(accessed	on	5.2.19)	
Based	on	these	fundamental	uncertainties	about	the	likelihood	of	intervention	during	
scarcity	periods,	some	economists	argue	that	there	is	‘missing	money’	in	the	electricity	
market.	This	has	been	used	as	a	basis	for	arguing	that	there	is	a	market	failure	with	respect	
to	investment	in	flexible	peaking	plant	which	is	crucial	for	the	security	of	the	system.	
‘Missing	money’	serves	as	a	justification	for	government	action	on	the	basis	that	there	is	a	
structural	flaw	in	liberalised	electricity	markets	with	regards	to	long-term	system	adequacy	
which	necessitates	a	market-wide	solution.	EOM	proponents	argue	that	market-based	CRMs	
which	make	capacity	payments	widely	available,	whether	through	market-wide	auctions	for	
capacity	contracts	–	capacity	markets	–	or	other	forms	of	allocation	mechanism8,	are	
typically	not	required	as	system	adequacy	issues	can	often	be	addressed	through	more	
short-term	and	focused	interventions,	i.e.	creating	a	strategic	reserve9.	Here,	forms	of	
generation	which	deliver	flexibility	in	the	specific	locations	where	this	deemed	be	necessary	
are	taken	out	of	the	market	and	provided	with	targeted	payments.		
As	the	British	and	German	cases	will	illustrate,	alongside	more	immediate	concerns	about	
electricity	system	reliability,	the	debate	about	CRMs	is	now	part	of	a	wider	set	of	questions	
around	the	role	and	design	of	electricity	markets	in	a	low	carbon	future	(IEA,	2016).	The	
need	to	integrate	variable	renewables	(VREs)	such	as	wind	and	solar	power	creates	added	
challenges	and	uncertainties	regarding	the	need	for	government	intervention	to	deliver	a	
safe	capacity	margin.	VREs	create	uncertainty	for	operators	and	investors	in	power	markets	
because	their	output	is	weather-dependent	and	hence	less	predictable.	Also,	they	operate	
at	close	to	zero	marginal	costs,	meaning	that	they	will	tend	to	push	conventional	generators	
out	of	the	market	if	weather	conditions	are	favourable,	creating	what	is	known	as	the	merit-
order	effect.		
Some	economists	have	argued,	for	example,	that	as	societies	move	away	from	fossil-fuels	
and	systems	become	decarbonised,	market	designs	based	on	energy	output	will	become	
redundant	and	prices	will	be	increasingly	determined	by	how	capacity	is	valued,	for	
example,	through	CRMs,	auctions	for	long	term	capacity	contracts	(Keay,	2016,	Helm,	2017)	
or	trading	mechanisms	designed	to	specifically	value	flexibility	(Liebreich,	2017,	PöYRY,	
2014).	The	question	of	how	electricity	capacity	is	valued	in	markets	is	likely	to	become	
increasingly	politicised	as	different	market	actors	seek	to	influence	which	technologies	can	
access	the	new	revenue	streams	and	gain	competitive	advantage	from	providing	capacity	
and	flexibility	services	to	the	system.		
																																																						
8	There	are	a	wide	range	of	potential	CRM	designs	(for	an	extensive	overview	and	a	discussion	of	the	benefits	
and	drawbacks	of	different	models	see	European	Commission	(2016)).	These	can	be	usefully	delineated	into	
targeted	and	market-wide	mechanisms.	The	former	refer	to	‘payments	to	selected	categories	of	capacity	
providers	only’	(e.g.	a	tender	for	new	capacity,	a	strategic	reserve	or	a	targeted	capacity	payment),	whereas	
the	latter	‘are	in	principle	open	to	participation	from	all	categories	of	capacity	providers’	(a	capacity	market	
with	an	auction	and	a	central	buyer,	a	de-central	obligation	on	suppliers	to	procure	a	certain	volume	of	
capacity,	or	a	market-wide	capacity	payment	to	all	generators	on	top	of	the	market	price).	
9	Although	the	option	was	not	discussed	in	the	GB	and	German	cases,	it	should	be	noted	that	an	alternative	to	
the	capacity	market	and	strategic	reserve	options	has	been	proposed	by	Hogan	and	implemented	in	the	ERCOT	
market	(Texas)	(Hogan,	2013).	The	idea	is	to	construct	a	demand	curve	for	reserves	–	termed	a	regulated	
operating	reserve	demand	curve	(ORDC)	-	which	is	based	on	bids	and	offers	in	the	market	and	fed	this	as	a	
price	signal	back	into	the	wholesale	market,	thus	linking	and	co-optimising	day-ahead	and	balancing	markets.	
3 CRMs	in	the	British	and	German	energy	transitions	
3.1 Introduction	to	the	cases		
The	British	case	outlines	the	lead	up	to	the	government’s	decision	to	introduce	a	capacity	
market	for	the	integrated	market	of	Scotland	and	England/Wales.	Prior	to	the	introduction	
of	the	market	in	2014,	Britain	relied	on	its	energy-only	market	to	deliver	a	safe	capacity	
margin.	In	effect	little	new	capacity	was	required	following	the	‘dash	for	gas’	of	the	1990s	
(Winskel,	2002).	This	situation	changed	in	the	late	2000s	when	the	UK	passed	a	Climate	
Change	Act	(2008)	which	legislated	for	a	80%	reduction	in	GHC	emissions	by	2050	from	1990	
levels.	Coinciding	with	this	were	concerns	about	an	over-reliance	on	imported	gas	at	a	time	
of	rising	global	prices	and	falling	North	Sea	production	relative	to	its	peak	in	the	early	2000s.	
A	review	of	the	UK’s	energy	security	situation,	Project	Discovery,	was	initiated	in	2009	by	
the	regulator	Ofgem.	The	report	concluded	that:	‘The	unprecedented	combination	of	the	
global	financial	crisis,	tough	environmental	targets,	increasing	gas	import	dependency	and	
the	closure	of	ageing	power	stations	has	combined	to	cast	reasonable	doubt	over	whether	
the	current	arrangements	will	deliver	secure	and	sustainable	electricity	supplies’	(Ofgem	
2010,	quoted	in	Newbery,	2015).	Project	Discovery	in	particular	expressed	a	strong	concern	
about	a	lack	of	investment	in	new	plant,	and	spurred	by	this	the	UK	government	initiated	
the	electricity	market	reform	(EMR)	process.	Largely	based	on	this	energy	security	concern,	
in	2013	the	Department	of	Energy	and	Climate	Change	(DECC)	in	Britain	opted	for	a	market-
wide	CRM	with	payments	offered	on	a	competitive	basis	to	all	potential	capacity	providers	
who	submit	bids	into	a	centrally	organised	capacity	auction	–	a	capacity	market.	
This	second	case	sets	out	the	process	by	which	the	Federal	German	Government	decided	
against	the	introduction	of	a	capacity	market,	as	in	the	British	case.	The	backdrop	to	the	
German	case	is	the	Energiewende	(Energy	Transition)	which	can	be	described	as	an	
overarching	policy	effort	to	transform	the	nation’s	energy	sector,	the	ambition	being	to	
decarbonise	the	German	economy	whilst	phasing	out	nuclear	power.	The	last	nuclear	power	
plant	will	shut	down	by	the	end	of	2022	and	the	share	of	renewables	in	total	power	
consumption	had	reached	32.5%	in	2015	(Agora	Energiewende,	2016).	Unlike	in	Britain,	the	
coal	industry	and	mining	lobby	have	retained	significant	power	in	Germany	(Renn	and	
Marshall,	2016)	and	as	a	result	the	construction	of	new	coal-fired	power	plants	has	
continued	well	into	this	century.	A	key	energy	paradox	therefore	in	Germany,	and	a	
challenge	facing	the	achievement	of	its	Energiewende,	is	the	significant	coal	generation	
capacity	which	is	retained	on	the	system,	currently	at	a	level	over	one	quarter	of	installed	
capacity	and	44%	of	electricity	produced	(Agora	Energiewende,	2015).	
3.2 Britain:	Finding	the	‘missing	money’	
3.2.1 2010	Consultation:	Initial	preference	for	a	targeted	mechanism		
In	December	2010	DECC	published	a	consultation	document	which	set	out	options	for	EMR	
(DECC,	2010b)10.	Initially	DECC	considered	four	main	options	for	a	CRM;	a	capacity	payment,	
a	decentralized	capacity	obligation,	a	capacity	market	based	on	auctions	and	a	targeted	
mechanism.	DECC	had	an	initial	preference	for	a	targeted	as	oppose	to	a	market-wide	
mechanism.	This	was	based	on	analysis	conducted	by	an	energy	consultancy	(Redpoint	
Energy,	2010)	which	found	through	market	simulations	that	a	capacity	payment	on	the	basis	
																																																						
10	There	were	four	main	pillars	of	the	EMR:	Carbon	price	support,	feed-in	tariffs,	capacity	payments	and	an	
emissions	performance	standard.	
of	a	market-wide	auction	would	benefit	‘existing	plant	that	no	longer	chose	to	close	under	
new	EU	environmental	legislation	(the	Industrial	Emissions	Directive)	as	this	was	the	lowest-
cost	option	for	generators,	allowing	them	to	maximize	returns	from	the	mechanism’.	Based	
on	this,	DECC	predicted	that	a	targeted	mechanism	would	result	in	more	new-build	gas	
plant	and	offered	‘greater	flexibility	in	the	type	of	resource	supported	which	may	be	
advantageous	depending	on	future	market	developments	(for	example	if	needed	to	provide	
back-up	for	intermittent	generation)’	(DECC,	2010b:	p.92).	The	ability	to	value	the	attributes	
of	different	forms	of	capacity,	rather	than	a	single	payment,	was	cited	as	a	key	benefit	of	
the	targeted	mechanism:	‘A	market-wide	capacity	mechanism	pays	the	same	capacity	
payment	to	all	types	of	resource.	However,	they	may	not	have	equal	value	in	terms	of	
maintaining	security	of	supply.	A	targeted	capacity	mechanism	can	run	different	tenders	for	
different	types	of	resource	need,	and	so	pay	different	prices.	This	is	expected	to	result	in	
lower	rents/producer	surplus	than	under	a	market-wide	capacity	mechanism’	(ibid:	p.95).	
Relative	to	the	market-wide	option,	the	targeted	approach	resulted	in	a	saving	over	the	
2010-2030	period	(DECC,	2010a),	indicating	a	more	preferential	outcome	in	welfare	terms	
for	a	targeted	mechanism11.	This	was	based	the	ability	to	discriminate	between	capacity	
resources	which	would	allow	DECC	to	favour	‘the	‘right’	type	of	flexible	resource’.	Also,	at	
this	time	the	level	of	intervention	required	was	not	viewed	as	substantial;	it	was	estimated	
that	5GW	of	capacity	‘to	2030	to	maintain	margins	at	10%’	would	be	required;	the	targeted	
approach	thus	had	the	benefit	of	‘lower	implementation	risks’.	A	targeted	approach,	it	was	
argued,	‘would	be	more	flexible	to	respond	to	future	changes	than	a	market-wide	capacity	
mechanism	because	it	has	more	opportunity	for	the	design	to	evolve,	making	it	durable	and	
more	able	to	adapt	to	be	compatible	with	European	markets	as	interconnection	increases’	
(DECC,	2010b:	P.	96).	
3.2.2 A	reappraisal	(2011-2013)	
Following	the	views	set	out	in	the	consultation	document	in	late	2010,	DECC	undertook	a	
reappraisal	of	its	initial	position.	In	its	July	2011	White	Paper	titled	Planning	Our	Electric	
Future	(DECC,	2011b),	DECC’s	tone	was	less	committal,	observing	that	in	responses	to	the	
initial	consultation	there	were	‘mixed	views’	on	the	targeted	proposal.	They	noted	that	
‘Some	respondents	to	the	consultation	took	the	view	that	capacity	margins	during	this	
decade	mean	that	a	mechanism	is	likely	to	be	needed.	Others	were	sceptical	of	the	need	for	
a	Capacity	Mechanism	and	argued	that	the	case	for	a	significant	market	intervention	had	
not	been	made’	(ibid:	p.	64).		
There	were	three	important	arguments	which	contributed	to	the	reappraisal,	summarised	
as	follows:	
1. More	concern	about	the	capacity	margin:	In	the	2010	consultation	document,	
although	concern	about	the	capacity	margin	was	expressed,	it	was	expected	to	
fluctuate	within	a	range	of	5-11%	above	peak	demand	in	the	2020s.	These	early	
calculations	presumed	no	intervention	to	reduce	carbon	emissions,	whereas	
updated	modelling	for	the	2011	paper	which	incorporated	the	effects	of	plant	
closures	and	increasing	amounts	of	low	carbon	generation	indicated	that	‘de-rated	
																																																						
11	Changes	to	NPVs	resulting	from	reductions	in	expected	energy	unserved	relative	to	do	nothing	baseline	for	
market-wide	and	targeted	interventions	were	£-774	and	£-694	respectively.	Figures	here	were	based	on	a	
value	of	lost	load	(VOLL)	of	£10k/MWh.	
capacity	margins	are	expected	to	fall	below	five	per	cent	in	some	years’,	particularly	
in	the	early	to	mid-2020s.	
2. The	‘missing	money’	problem:	Although	not	mentioned	in	the	2010	consultation	this	
emerged	as	a	key	argument	in	the	consultation	submissions	and	the	subsequent	
reappraisal	of	options.	As	will	be	explained	below,	DECC	began	to	incorporate	this	as	
a	new	variable	into	their	cost-benefit	calculations	and	this	played	an	important	role	
in	the	reappraisal.	
3. The	‘slippery	slope	effect’:	The	risk	that	providing	secure	revenues	to	plants	who	
operate	within	the	reserve	would	reduce	incentives	to	operate	in	the	market	was	
highlighted	by	many	respondents.	This	is	because	wholesale	price	spikes	are	likely	to	
be	reduced	if	the	reserve	is	deployed	very	regularly	and	if	the	trigger	price	for	doing	
so	is	well	below	VOLL.	This	may	necessitate	government	to	continually	expand	the	
size	of	the	reserve,	resulting	in	the	wholesale	market	being	further	undermined,	thus	
exacerbating	the	original	problem.	This	argument,	DECC	note,	was	highlighted	in	a	
large	number	of	the	consultation	submissions	and	received	more	prominence	in	the	
2011	document.		
Based	on	these	arguments	one	of	the	Annexes	of	the	White	Paper	included	a	new	
consultation	document	on	‘possible	models	for	a	Capacity	Mechanism’	(DECC,	2011b).	The	
targeted	mechanism,	with	plants	in	a	strategic	reserve	only	operating	once	a	trigger	price	
has	been	reached	-	referred	to	as	‘economic	dispatch’	-	remained	the	preferred	option,	
however,	significant	weight	was	given	to	the	slippery	slope	and	missing	money	arguments.	
DECC	subsequently	addressed	the	consultation	responses	in	the	form	of	a	Technical	Update	
to	the	White	Paper:	Of	a	total	of	74	respondents	‘35	per	cent	of	respondents	preferred	
some	form	of	market-wide	mechanism.	Another	25	per	cent	of	respondents	preferred	a	
Strategic	Reserve,	and	25	per	cent	of	respondents	did	not	express	a	preference	on	the	type	
of	mechanism.	20	per	cent	of	respondents	did	not	believe	any	form	of	capacity	mechanism	
is	required’	(DECC,	2011c).	Four	of	the	six	large	utilities	in	Britain	advocated	a	capacity	
market,	largely	on	the	basis	that	it	would	facilitate	new	investment	by	creating	certainty	in	
the	market12.		
Indicating	that	the	missing	money	argument	became	increasingly	important	in	DECC’s	
appraisal,	they	highlight	that	a	capacity	market	‘tackles	at	source	the	problem	of	volatile	
and	uncertain	prices,	which	may	undermine	the	case	for	investing	in	capacity’	(ibid:	p.	28).	
This	is	a	reframing	of	the	basic	problem,	away	from	one	of	a	capacity	shortage	on	the	British	
system	over	a	specific	timeframe,	to	a	fundamental	problem	with	the	operation	of	
liberalized	electricity	markets	more	generally.	A	similar	phenomenon	is	highlighted	by	
Breslau	for	the	case	of	the	PJM	market	in	the	United	States	where,	rather	than	a	capacity	
																																																						
12	Lockwood	(2017)	conducts	a	detailed	analysis	of	incumbent	market	players’	position	in	relation	to	the	
capacity	market	versus	strategic	reserve	debate.	Four	of	the	‘big	six’	and	four	of	the	second	tier	generators	
initially	supported	some	form	of	capacity	intervention	whereas	RWE,	E.ON,	DONG	and	ESB	had	advocated	an	
energy-only	market	based	approach.	The	general	trend	was	that	companies	with	coal	and	nuclear	dominated	
generated	portfolios	favoured	the	market-wide	approach	because	they	were	more	interested	in	steady	
payments	rather	than	sharp	and	potentially	very	high	prices	at	scarcity	periods.	E.ON,	RWE,	ESB	and	DONG	had	
recently	made	investments	or	had	interests	in	new	gas	plant.	Lockwood	argues	that	government	ministers	at	
this	time	was	predisposed	to	introducing	a	significant	market	intervention	and	the	incumbent	generators	were	
‘pushing	at	an	open	door’.	
intervention	designed	to	address	a	specific	local	issue,	market-wide	efficiency	is	the	criteria	
against	which	options	are	assessed	(Breslau,	2013).		
Incorporating	institutional	and	administrative	costs	and	covering	the	2010-2030	period,	the	
net	present	value	(NPV	(£))	for	the	targeted	and	market-wide	options	were	recalculated	
against	the	business-as-usual	(BAU)	trajectory	as	£-1116	and	£-2613	respectively	(DECC,	
2011a).	Similar	to	the	2010	impact	assessment	(IA),	neither	intervention	could	be	justified	
on	purely	economic	terms	and	the	targeted	mechanism	had	greater	welfare	benefits	
relative	to	the	market-wide	mechanism.		
There	were	two	notable	changes	from	the	previous	IA	however.	Firstly,	DECC	conducted	a	
sensitivity	analysis	with	a	‘stress	test’	scenario	which	included	a	£5,000/MWh	price	cap,	
representing	missing	money.	In	this	scenario	the	cost	of	the	capacity	market	was	lower	in	
NPV	terms	(£-2683	vs	£-2734	for	a	strategic	reserve	(ibid:	p.32))	because	‘there	are	positive	
marginal	benefits	of	increasing	capacity	above	the	level	delivered	in	the	BAU’	and	‘the	
closure	of	coal	plant	under	the	IED	[Industrial	Emissions	Directive]	which	takes	place	under	
the	central	scenario,	now	no	longer	takes	place’	(ibid:	p.	32).	Second,	DECC	appraised	the	
options	both	quantitatively	and	qualitatively.	In	a	separate	section	to	the	IA	costs	are	
assessed	alongside	a	wider	range	of	risks	and	benefits,	and	particular	consideration	was	
given	to	the	issue	of	market	power.	It	was	judged	that	a	‘Capacity	Market	has	the	potential	
to	be	most	effective	at	reducing	gaming	opportunities	in	the	energy	market’	whereas	a	
strategic	reserve	‘is	unlikely	to	have	benefits	in	reducing	gaming	as	it	is	only	dispatched	at	as	
generator	of	last	resort…meaning	that	there	is	still	scope	for	significant	price	spikes	in	the	
energy	market’	(ibid:	p.	36).		
Based	on	this	reappraisal	DECC’s	final	view	was	that:	‘A	Capacity	Market	is	the	preferred	
option	as	it	best	addresses	the	market	failures	and	is	robust	to	a	range	of	scenarios.	It	
should	also	reduce	regulatory	and	market	risks	for	investors,	potentially	reducing	
investment	costs’	(ibid:	p.	1).	DECC	had	changed	its	initial	view,	largely	based	on	concerns	
about	a	structural	issue	with	the	market	which	was	resulting	in	missing	money	and	which	
fed	into	concerns	about	long	term	reliability.	A	capacity	market	which	was	subsequently	
approved	by	Parliament	in	the	2013	Energy	Act.		
3.3 Germany:	A	flexibility	framing	
3.3.1 The	Starting	Point:	A	Debate	on	Capacity	Remuneration	Mechanisms	(2011-13)	
In	September	2011	a	study	commissioned	by	BNE	(Bundesverband	Neue	Energiewirtschaft),	
a	trade	association	advocating	the	interests	of	new	entrants	to	the	energy	market,	kicked	
off	an	extensive	public	discussion	on	CRMs	in	Germany	(BNE,	2011).	The	key	message	of	the	
report	was	that	in	order	to	guarantee	security	of	supply,	30	GW	of	new	firm	capacity	would	
be	necessary	until	2030,	but	that	at	the	same	time	there	was	no	business	case	for	
investments	in	power	plants	given	prevailing	low	wholesale	power	prices.	The	underlying	
hypothesis	was	that	the	existing	market	design	would	not	guarantee	security	of	supply	and	
that	a	CRM	would	be	required.	The	report	suggested	the	introduction	of	a	CRM	which	was	
selective,	in	the	sense	that	it	only	addressed	new	investment	in	capacities,	and	was	
centralized;	i.e.	that	a	government-controlled	authority	should	have	responsibility	for	
estimating	the	capacity	needed	and	procuring	it	through	auctions.	It	was	further	argued	that	
high	windfall	profits	for	incumbents	would	be	the	outcome	if	a	market-wide	mechanism	was	
introduced.		
While	the	idea	of	organizing	an	additional	revenue	stream	by	introducing	a	CRM	was	
appealing	to	many	stakeholders	in	the	sector,	the	suggestion	to	exclude	large	parts	of	the	
existing	capacities	was	highly	controversial	and	the	very	idea	of	selectivity	was	criticised	by	
many.	A	study	commissioned	by	the	German	Federal	Ministry	of	Economic	Affairs	and	
Energy	(EWI,	2012)	suggested	a	centralized	and	market-wide	CRM.	If	a	CRM	is	to	serve	the	
purpose	of	providing	sufficient	capacity,	they	argued,	it	cannot	exclude	existing	capacity	
from	auctions	and	be	an	efficient	solution.		
Interestingly,	environmental	NGOs,	historically	quite	influential	voices	in	German	energy	
policy,	adopted	different	positions	on	the	issue.	Greenpeace,	for	example,	tended	to	be	
sceptical	of	the	need	for	CRMs,	while	the	World	Wildlife	Fund	in	Germany	(Öko-Institut	et	
al.,	2012)	favoured	a	targeted	capacity	market	with	payments	limited	to	new	and	flexible	
capacities,	partly	because	they	were	concerned	that	insufficient	capacity	margins	might	be	
used	as	an	excuse	to	delay	the	planned	nuclear	phase-out.	
Not	surprisingly,	since	selective	approaches	are	not	in	line	with	the	interests	of	incumbent	
power-generators,	the	trade-associations	advocating	their	interests	–	BDEW	and	VKU13	–	
suggested	a	market-wide	CRM,	however,	instead	of	administratively	determining	the	
amount	and	type	of	capacity	needed,	it	was	to	be	determined	de-centrally	by	demand	with	
an	obligation	to	hold	capacity	placed	on	suppliers	who	sell	power	to	customers,	as	set	out	in	
a	report	commissioned	by	VKU	(Enervis	Energy	Advisors,	2013).	In	addition	to	the	several	
CRM	designs	suggested,	a	strategic	reserve	was	discussed	in	a	BDEW	report	(Consentec,	
2012),	not	so	much	as	an	instrument	to	meet	the	capacity	challenge	in	the	long	term,	but	to	
provide	an	additional	layer	of	security	in	times	of	economic	and	regulatory	transformation.		
Roughly,	those	were	the	options	on	the	table	of	the	Kraftwerksforum	(power	plant	forum),	a	
stakeholder-platform	hosted	by	the	Ministry	of	Economic	Affairs	(for	an	overview	over	all	
the	options	in	discussed	see:	Energiewende,	2013).	This	forum	had	been	mandated	in	late	
2012	by	the	Chancellor	and	the	Minister	Presidents	of	the	German	states	to	work	out	a	
concept	for	a	market	design	that	would	guarantee	security	of	supply	whilst	retaining	a	
competitive	approach.	Its	findings	were	set	out	in	a	report	published	in	May	2013	(BMWi,	
2013).	The	main	message	was	that,	due	to	the	fact	that	too	many	fundamental	questions	
were	still	unanswered,	a	decision	of	such	importance	should	not	be	taken	at	this	point.	After	
the	report	was	published	the	discussion	was	put	on	hold	for	a	year	due	to	political	attention	
focusing	on	federal	elections	in	October	2013	and	changing	responsibilities	at	the	Ministry	
of	Economic	Affairs.		
3.3.2 The	Green	Paper	
Until	2013	the	responsibility	for	energy	market	design	was	primarily	located	in	the	Ministry	
of	Economics	and	Technology,	but	the	Ministry	of	Environmental	Affairs’	role	was	also	key	
as	it	was	responsible	for	administering	renewable	energy	subsidies.	Following	the	election,	
the	new	administration	merged	responsibilities	of	these	two	departments	to	form	a	new	
department,	the	Ministry	of	Economic	Affairs	and	Energy	(BMWi),	and	this	institutional	
realignment	played	a	key	role	in	a	reframing	of	the	capacity	question14.	Although	no	clear	
																																																						
13	BDEW	(Bundesverband	der	Energie-	und	Wasserwirtschaft)	is	the	trade-association	advocating	the	interests	
of	a	wide	range	of	companies,	including	the	large	incumbents	in	energy-generation.	VKU	(Verband	
kommunaler	Unternehmen)	advocates	the	interests	of	municipally	owned	companies.			
14	Our	insights	on	the	formulation	of	the	Green	Paper	in	the	German	case,	in	particular	how	organizational	
changes	in	the	government	department	influenced	this,	was	informed	by	interviews	with	two	civil	servants	
positions	were	stated	prior	to	the	merger	and	views	were	not	uniformly	held,	the	economics	
ministry	traditionally	had	a	preference	for	market-wide	capacity	solutions	in	the	vein	of	the	
British	capacity	market,	whereas	there	was	more	scepticism	in	the	environment	department	
on	the	grounds	that	technology	neutral	mechanisms	would	potentially	favour	incumbent	
coal	and	gas	producers	and	act	as	a	barrier	to	further	renewables	deployment.	There	was	
also	some	concern	that	introducing	an	elaborate	and	administratively	burdensome	capacity	
market	would	result	in	lock-in	and	would	be	difficult	to	dismantle	further	down	the	line.		
Reform	of	the	electricity	market	was	the	main	item	on	the	agenda	of	the	new	department,	
and	in	order	to	avoid	conflict,	efforts	were	made	to	find	common	ground	between	the	
different	constituencies.	The	merger	of	the	departments	resulted	in	a	blending	of	different	
views	rather	than	an	imposition	of	one	view	over	the	other.	A	group,	primarily	composed	of	
former	Environment	Ministry	analysts,	began	to	propose	an	alternative	framing	of	the	
problem;	that	the	issue	was	not	one	of	a	capacity	shortage	in	a	conventional	quantitative	
sense,	rather	a	lack	of	flexibility	on	the	system.	This	was	backed	up	by	a	number	of	studies	
which	were	published	around	this	time	which	concluded	that	there	were	in	fact	significant	
overcapacities	if	one	analyzed	the	German	system	along	with	the	capacity	it	could	access	in	
neighbouring	countries	through	trading	on	the	European	day-ahead	market.	A	later	policy	
White	Paper	estimated	this	overcapacity	to	be	in	the	region	of	60GW	(BMWi,	2015c).		
The	broad	outlines	of	a	market	reform	proposal	were	set	out	in	a	Green	Paper	titled	‘An	
Electricity	Market	for	Germany’s	Energy	Transition’	(BMWi,	2015b)	which	was	published	in	
October	2014.	Two	main	options	were	proposed:	The	first	was	a	capacity	market	similar	to	
the	British,	the	second	was	termed	the	‘Electricity	Market	2.0’	(EM	2.0)	which	is	based	on	a	
capacity	(strategic)	reserve.	The	reserve	was	projected	to	be	5%	of	average	annual	peak	
load,	with	contracts	to	be	awarded	following	a	competitive	auction.	While	the	key	technical	
study	underpinning	the	Green	Paper	found	that	there	was	no	long	term	structural	issue	with	
the	German	market	in	terms	of	missing	money	(Consentec	and	R2b,	2015),	a	simulation	
based	on	a	‘worst	case	scenario’	–	involving	delays	in	new	transmission	capacity,	premature	
decommissioning	of	plant,	poor	functioning	of	the	balancing	market,	extreme	weather	
conditions	etc.	–	resulted	in	a	loss	of	load	expectation	(LOLE)	of	5hrs/year,	creating	the	need	
for	a	more	limited	form	of	capacity	intervention.	The	German	Government	proposed	three	
separate	types	of	reserve:	
1. A	capacity	reserve	where	providers	seeking	remuneration	would	be	invited	to	bid	
into	auctions	jointly	managed	by	the	four	TSOs.	The	reserve	would	be	based	on	a	
two-yearly	cycle	with	delivery	of	capacity	one	year	after	the	auction,	the	first	of	
which	will	be	in	2018.	The	size	of	the	reserve	for	the	first	of	these	periods	would	be	2	
GW,	with	an	indicative	overall	limit	of	5%	of	peak	demand	for	future	auctions.	The	
reserve	would	be	utilised	if	the	day-ahead	and	intraday	markets	did	not	clear,	and	
penal	imbalance	charges	(€20,000/MWh)	would	be	charged	to	market	participants	
found	to	be	responsible	for	this.	
2. A	network	reserve	to	deal	with	north-south	bottlenecks	in	the	transmission	grid.	This	
was	first	introduced	in	2013	and	the	proposal	here	is	simply	to	extend	it.	It	enables	
the	relevant	TSOs	to	‘redispatch’	by	contracting	with	power	plants,	the	majority	of	
																																																						
who	were	close	to	this	process.	Also,	the	second	author	had	knowledge	of	this	while	he	was	working	at	the	
energy	think	tank	Agora	Energiewende.	The	Executive	Director	of	that	organization	was	appointed	as	secretary	
of	state	with	responsibility	for	energy-related	issues	at	the	Ministry	of	Economic	Affairs	and	Energy	in	2014.	
which	are	uneconomic	plants	located	in	southern	Germany	which	would	otherwise	
likely	shut	down.	At	times	of	grid	congestion	these	plants	are	called	upon	while	wind	
power	plants	in	the	north	of	the	country	are	ramped	down	and	paid	compensation.	
In	2016	the	size	of	the	network	reserve	was	5.4	GW,	at	a	cost	of	€126m.	It	is	
envisioned	that	as	new	transmission	capacity	is	built	the	need	for	this	would	
diminish.		
3. A	lignite	reserve	in	which	eight	highly	polluting	coal	plants	would	be	taken	out	of	the	
market,	a	total	of	2.7	GW,	or	13%	of	generating	capacity	from	lignite	plants	in	the	
country.	This	cost	of	this	is	estimated	at	€1.6	bn.	As	we	discuss	further	in	section	4,	
the	government	was	motivated	to	introduce	this	as	a	measure	to	meet	near-term	
climate	change	targets	rather	than	to	address	system	reliability	concerns.	In	this	
sense	the	lignite	reserve	is	more	of	a	climate	change	policy	rather	than	a	CRM	in	the	
traditional	sense.		
The	Green	Paper	was	assembled	and	structured	in	a	way	which,	as	far	as	possible,	sought	to	
reduce	and	mitigate	potential	disagreements	about	the	market	design	options.	The	need	for	
greater	flexibility	in	the	electricity	system,	as	oppose	to	expanding	capacity,	was	set	out	
upfront	as	it	was	seen	by	the	authors	of	the	paper	as	an	area	of	mutual	agreement	between	
the	two	general	constituencies.	These	were;	1)	those	primarily	concerned	with	economic	
efficiency	and	pricing;	and	2)	those	concerned	with	emissions	and	renewables.	Although	the	
Green	Paper	was	initially	thought	of	as	the	starting	point	in	a	broad	public	debate	about	the	
range	of	options,	it	leaned	heavily	towards	the	reserve	option	and	extensive	consultation	
with	stakeholders	–	696	participants,	among	them	484	citizens	and	212	organizations	–	
pointed	to	a	strong	degree	of	consensus.	Not	all	stakeholders	viewed	it	in	this	way	however.	
The	decision	not	to	introduce	a	capacity	market	was	contested	by	important	stakeholders,	
among	them	the	largest	trade	associations	(BDEW,	VKU),	large	utilities	(RWE,	EON)	and	two	
of	the	German	states,	Bavaria	and	Baden-Württemberg,	who	do	not	have	significany	coal	
mining	industries	and	are	most	affected	by	the	north-south	bottleneck	of	Germany’s	
transmission	system	(BMWi,	2015a).		
Building	on	the	Green	Paper	and	its	consultation,	a	White	Paper	(BMWi,	2015c)	was	
published	in	July	2015	which	contained	a	commitment	to	the	so	called	Electricity	Market	
2.0.	In	September	2015	the	ministry	published	a	first	draft	law15	and	after	consultation	with	
stakeholders	and	the	German	states,	the	federal	cabinet	adopted	a	second	draft	in	early	
November	of	that	year.	The	parliamentary	process	commenced	with	a	first	reading	in	the	
Bundestag	on	January	29th	2016	and	the	law	was	adopted	later	that	year	(BMWi,	2016).	
4 Key	ambiguities	shaping	the	politics	of	CRMs	
In	this	section	we	discuss	the	politics	of	CRMs	in	relation	to	specific	debates	around	their	
justification	and	design,	particularly	with	respect	to	the	forms	of	capacity	are	deemed	
eligible	or	not	for	capacity	payments.	This	section	is	based	on	a	comparative	analysis	of	the	
British	and	German	country-level	cases,	along	with	evidence	from	EU	Commission	appraisals	
of	the	two	CRMs.		
																																																						
15	‘Entwurf	eines	Gesetzes	zur	Weiterentwicklung	des	Strommarktes	(Strommarktgesetz)’	which	translates	to	
‘Draft	Law	for	the	Advancement	of	the	Electricity	Market	(Electricity	Market	Law)’	
4.1 How	are	CRMs	justified?	
In	both	cases,	particularly	during	the	early	phases	when	the	case	needed	to	be	made	for	
government	intervention,	the	need	for	a	CRM	was	questioned	and	debated.	In	Germany,	
when	the	Economic	Ministry	initially	assessed	the	capacity	issue	at	a	national	scale	it	was	
presumed	that	a	capacity	market	would	be	necessary.	However,	renewables	expansion	has	
been	significant	over	the	past	decade	and	its	investment	in	coal	generation	capacity	has	not	
stalled	to	the	same	extent	as	it	has	in	Britain	where	coal	plants	had	been	exposed	to	market	
signals	from	the	mid-1990s.	How	to	utilise	its	excess	capacity	rather	than	an	issue	of	a	lack	
of	investment	emerged	as	the	key	problem	framing;	a	strategic	reserve	was	legitimized	on	
the	basis	that	it	would	act	as	an	insurance	policy	in	a	system	increasingly	reliant	on	
renewable	generation.	Indicating	the	importance	of	different	types	of	expertise	in	the	
process,	it	wasn’t	until	the	market	dialogue	brought	about	by	the	election	and	the	
subsequent	institutional	and	personnel	changes	following	the	merger	of	the	two	ministries	
that	the	capacity	situation	was	reassessed	in	the	wider	context	of	European	international	
flows.	The	problem	was	subsequently	reframed	as	one	of	a	lack	of	flexibility.		
The	British	case,	where	there	was	more	concern	about	the	need	to	attract	new	investment	
into	the	sector	to	replace	retiring	fossil-fuel	plant,	illustrates	well	how	a	calculation	based	on	
an	economic	theory	–	the	‘missing	money’	–	played	an	important	role	in	reframing	the	
system	and	legitimizing	the	capacity	market	option.	This	calculation,	as	DECC	noted,	was	
quite	speculative	as	there	was	little	knowledge	as	to	the	extent	of	the	missing	money	in	the	
market,	and	it	was	highly	contingent	on	the	value	placed	on	lost	load	(VOLL).	In	this	context,	
as	Lockwood	(2017)	has	noted,	a	government	conscious	of	the	political	and	economic	
damage	of	blackouts	was	always	likely	to	risk	over-procurement	and	the	windfall	payments	
to	incumbent	generators	many	attribute	to	a	capacity	market.	Some	commentators	have	
criticised	the	government	for	underestimating	the	amount	of	capacity	available	on	the	
system	(Baker	and	Hogan,	2014),	with	one	environmental	think-tank	posing	the	question:	‘Is	
the	capacity	mechanism	trying	to	solve	a	non-problem?’	(Sandbag,	2014).	The	stated	
intention	of	the	market	had	been	to	bring	forward	investment	in	new	combined-cycle	gas	
turbine	(CCGT)	plants,	and	detailed	analysis	by	Lockwood	(2017)	indicated	that	the	
incumbent	domestic	generators	lobbied	hard	against	the	SR	option,	as	a	market-wide	
intervention	would	tend	to	favour	their	plant.	The	outcome	in	this	case,	Lockwood	argues,	is	
symptomatic	of	a	‘dominant	energy	sector	culture’	involving	‘incumbents,	a	handful	of	
energy	consultancy	firms	and	a	relatively	small	number	of	“experts”’16.	
Aside	from	the	physical	characteristics	of	the	two	systems,	a	key	difference	in	both	cases	
was	how	the	decision	to	opt	for	a	particular	CRM	design,	whether	a	market-wide	
mechanism	or	a	strategic	reserve,	was	justified	on	the	basis	of	its	alignment	with	free	
market	principles.	In	one	case	(Britain)	a	strategic	reserve	came	to	be	viewed	as	an	
unacceptable	intervention	in	the	market	as	it	implied	the	imposition	of	a	cap	on	wholesale	
market	prices.	In	the	other	case	(Germany)	the	strategic	reserve	option	was	framed	as	an	
enabler	for	an	energy-only	market	where	prices	could	form	freely	and	direct	dispatch	and	
investments	decisions.	While	the	EOM	was	the	main	justification,	these	‘market-friendly’	
features	of	the	German	approach	are	by	no	means	clear	based	on	a	reading	of	the	
economics	literature.	Some	economists	argue	that	the	German	approach	of	committing	to	
undistorted	and	sharp	price	signals	in	energy	and	other	short-term	markets	for	balancing	is	
																																																						
16	http://projects.exeter.ac.uk/igov/new-thinking-the-capacity-market-how-did-we-get-here/						
enough	to	address	the	missing	money	issue	(Hogan,	2016),	while	for	others,	‘missing	
money’	is	only	one	of	a	number	of	barriers	and	that	the	volatility	of	such	a	market	would	
introduce	risks	and	uncertainties	which	would	not	be	conducive	to	new	investment	(Roques	
and	Finon,	2017;	Cramton	and	Ockenfels,	2011).	
In	a	European	context,	electricity	market	reforms	are	shaped	by	complex,	multi-level	
governance	processes	and	the	EU	level	appraisal	of	national	CRMs	is	becoming	more	
influential.	The	EU	can	exert	influence	in	this	area	through	its	legal	powers	to	enforce	state-
aid	rules,	however,	EU	powers	in	relation	to	energy	policy	are	somewhat	limited	as	Member	
States	(MS)	retain	the	right	to	determine	their	own	generation	mix	to	meet	energy	security	
and	environmental	goals.	Within	these	constraints,	DG	Competition	were	assessing	the	
CRMs	mainly	against	the	specific	provisions	of	the	State	Aid	for	Environmental	Protection	
and	Energy	Guidelines	(EEAG)17,	by	which	the	Commission	judges	whether	an	intervention	is	
compatible	with	various	electricity	market	legislation	and	regulations.	The	EEAG	provisions	
are	mainly	in	place	to	provide	MSs	leeway	to	achieve	collective	environmental	policies,	in	
particular	the	2030	Energy	and	Climate	Framework.	They	include	a	section	on	‘Aid	for	
generation	adequacy’	(section	3.9)	which	specifies	the	terms	under	which	a	CRM	might	
qualify	for	for	approval,	such	as;	whether	it	addresses	a	defined	and	quantified	generation	
adequacy	problem,	that	the	underlying	issue	is	as	a	result	of	a	market	failure,	that	
alternatives	were	considered,	and	that	the	measure	does	not	have	negative	impacts	for	
competition	and	trade.		
Concerned	about	the	distorting	impacts	of	national-level	CRMs,	DG	Comp	launched	a	sector	
investigation	into	the	introduction	of	capacity	mechanisms	in	a	number	of	countries	in	April	
201518.	Their	main	concerns	were	twofold,	as	expressed	by	the	competition	Commissioner	
Margrethe	Vestager19;	firstly,	that	CRMs	would	interfere	with	competition	within	markets	
and	‘unduly	favour	particular	producers	or	technologies’,	and	secondly	that	they	would	
interfere	with	trade	between	these	markets	i.e.	‘create	obstacles	to	trade	across	national	
borders’.	The	analysis	for	the	review	is	contained	in	an	extensive	a	DG	Comp	staff	working	
paper	(European	Commission,	2016)	which	found	significant	inconsistencies	in	the	
justification	for	CRMs	and	a	lack	of	coherent	cost-benefit	appraisal.	In	many	cases	capacity	
assessments	were	not	based	on	a	defined	reliability	standard	and	there	was	no	assessment	
of	the	value	of	the	reserve	capacity	to	the	system	as	a	whole.		
While	approving	the	UK	application	(discussed	further	below),	DG	Comp	initially	rejected	
the	German	government’s	application	for	state-aid	approval	of	its	main	capacity	reserve,	for	
three	main	reasons;	1)	lack	of	a	specified	end	date;	2)	no	definition	of	system	parameters	
(LOLE	or	VOLL)	upon	which	an	economic	appraisal	could	be	based	and	3)	ambiguities	around	
the	scenario	methodology	used	to	quantify	the	size	of	the	reserve.	The	German	government	
had	argued	that	the	capacity	reserve	should	be	analysed	separately	from	the	market	as	it	
would	not	be	possible	to	accurately	cost	the	measure	and	evaluate	whether	the	scheme	
would	deliver	the	investment	signals	required	to	ensure	that	the	reserve	would	not	be	
needed	in	the	long	term.	They	went	on	to	argue	that,	based	on	criteria	which	sets	out	the	
																																																						
17	Guidelines	on	State	aid	for	environmental	protection	and	energy	2014-2020.	
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/legislation_en.html		
18	The	German	CRM	was	part	of	this	wider	inquiry.	Decisions	for	all	countries	can	be	found	here:	
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/state_aid_to_secure_electricity_supply_en.html		
19	http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4891_en.htm		
definition	of	a	‘service	of	general	economic	interest’	20,	its	reserves	were	not	state-aid	as	
they	did	not	involve	any	direct	payments	to	generators	by	government.	However,	this	was	
rejected	by	the	DG	Comp.	A	CRM,	or	any	intervention,	such	as	a	FiT,	which	involves	an	
obligation	on	energy	market	participants	and	a	cost	which	is	recovered	through	tariffs,	is	
regarded	as	state-aid21.	Ultimately,	although	the	German	government	did	not	agree	to	base	
the	economic	appraisal	of	the	reserve	on	a	VOLL,	they	committed	to	calculate	the	potential	
impacts	of	the	‘worst	case	scenario’	which	could	then	be	used	as	a	basis	for	a	CBA	and	an	
economic	justification	for	the	CRM	(European	Commission,	2018).	
Despite	the	increasingly	active	role	of	the	EU,	the	British	and	German	state-aid	cases	show	
that	there’s	still	significant	room	for	ambiguity	and	flexibility	at	the	national	level,	
particularly	in	relation	to	the	security	of	supply	assessment	upon	which	a	capacity	
assessment	is	based,	and	eligibility	criteria	(discussed	further	below).	In	response	to	this	
ambiguity,	the	EU	Commission,	as	part	of	its	Clean	Energy	for	All	Europeans	Package22,	is	
now	putting	forward	proposals	for	the	harmonisation	of	capacity	assessment	
methodologies	and	cost-benefit	appraisals	across	Europe.	It	is	too	early	at	the	time	of	
writing	to	evaluate	the	significance	of	these	proposals,	but	needless	to	say	they	raise	
questions	about	the	autonomy	of	nation-states	to	introduce	preferred	capacity	measures	
and	the	authority	of	different	institutions	in	a	complex	multi-level	market.	It	also	illustrated	
how	there	are	different	logics	underpinning	the	evaluation	of	proposed	reforms	and	at	
times	these	can	come	into	conflict.	
4.2 Which	capacity	is	eligible?	
A	second	question	and	key	factor	shaping	the	CRMs	and	their	interaction	with	the	wider	
energy	transition	is	how	different	forms	of	capacity	are	prioritised	and	deemed	eligible	(or	
not)	to	access	capacity	payments.		
The	measure	to	prioritise	specific	lignite	power-plants	in	Germany	is	an	obvious	example	of	
favouring	domestic	producers	and	the	increasingly	important	interaction	between	CRMs	
and	climate	policy.	The	German	government	had	been	under	pressure	to	meet	its	self-
imposed	target	for	economy-wide	emissions	reductions	by	2020	of	40%	from	1990	levels.	
Business-as-usual-scenarios	have	shown	that	Germany	will	miss	this	goal	by	five	to	eight	
percent	(Energiewende,	2016)	and	in	order	to	close	this	gap	the	federal	government	
decided	to	implement	a	Climate	Action	Program	in	2014	(BMUB,	2014),	which	included	an	
obligation	on	the	electricity	sector	to	contribute	an	additional	annual	saving	of	22m	tonnes	
of	carbon	(Enervis	Energy	Advisors,	2015).	Highly	polluting	lignite	coal	generation	became	a	
target	for	achieving	this23.	Initially,	there	had	been	a	proposal	to	phase-out	lignite	by	placing	
an	obligation	on	generators	to	pay	for	additional	certificates	in	the	EU’s	Emissions	Trading	
Scheme	(EUETS),	however,	this	was	seen	as	placing	a	cost	on	the	industry	and	was	not	
politically	viable.	Interestingly,	the	payments	under	the	reserve	proposal	are	not	for	the	
provision	of	capacity,	rather	based	on	compensation,	calculated	as	the	opportunity	costs	of	
not	participating	in	the	market	on	a	normal	commercial	basis.	It	provides	a	more	politically	
																																																						
20	Set	out	in	the	2003	Altmark	ruling	Case	C-280/00		
21	On	the	basis	of	the	Vent	de	Colère	case	(ECLI:EU:C:2013:851).	
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62012CJ0262&lang1=en&lang2=BG&type=TXT&ancre=		
22	https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy-and-energy-union/clean-energy-all-europeans		
23	The	aim	of	the	lignite	reserve	is	to	save	12.5m	tonnes	per	year,	with	the	first	being	decommissioned	by	end	
of	2020	and	the	last	by	end	of	2023.	
amenable	‘soft	landing’	for	these	plants	which	are	located	in	regions	of	the	country	which	
are	heavily	dependent	on	mining	for	employment	and	economic	prosperity24.		
The	inclusion	of	coal	plants	in	CRMs	in	recent	years	have	became	politicized	as	part	of	wider	
EU	discussions	about	electricity	market	reform	and	climate	governance.	Greenpeace25,	for	
example,	estimated	that	across	European	markets	capacity	payments	‘have	almost	
quadrupled	in	the	last	twenty	years’	with	€32.6	billion	being	spend	between	1998-2018	and	
‘a	further	€25.7	billion	until	2040’.	For	both	existing	and	planned	capacity	payments	across	
European	markets	they	found	that	66%	of	revenues	will	likely	goes	to	coal	plants.	Just	
before	Christmas	2018	a	compromise	was	reached	at	the	EU	level	regarding	emissions	limits	
on	new	and	existing	capacity	mechanisms	through	which	capacity	payments	for	new	coal	
plants	coming	into	operation	after	2020	would	not	be	allowed,	and	by	2025	this	will	cover	
all	plants	emitting	550gr	CO2/kWh	or	more,	apart	from	certain	certain	highly	efficient	
peaking	plant	with	low	utilisation.	The	agreement	drew	criticism	however	as	the	Polish	
government	successfully	negotiated	for	a	‘grandfathering	clause’	for	capacity	payments	
which	had	been	agreed	prior	to	the	entry	into	force	of	the	revised	EU	Directive	in	2020,	
enabling	plants	emitting	above	the	agreed	limit	to	continue	receiving	payments26.		
A	key	EU	concern	in	relation	to	the	German	case	was	the	‘restrictive	eligibility	criteria’	which	
essentially	meant	that	DSR	would	be	severely	limited	–	due	to	a	minimum	bid	size	of	10	MW	
and	no	access	for	aggregated	loads	–	and	that	foreign	capacity	could	not	participate	in	the	
auctions.	The	German	government’s	logic	for	this	was	that	the	market	price	would	be	so	
high	that	in	the	event	of	a	shortage	only	plant	with	very	high	marginal	operating	costs	
should	participate	in	the	reserve;	all	other	sources	should	be	made	available	to	the	market	
in	order	to	prevent	this	from	occurring	in	the	first	place.	On	the	basis	of	the	EU’s	opening	
decision	to	reject	the	application,	the	German	government	later	committed	to	address	a	
number	of	these	concerns,	for	example	by	reducing	the	size	limit	from	10	to	5	MW,	by	
allowing	aggregated	loads	to	participate,	to	limit	the	term	of	the	reserve	to	three	2	year	
periods	and	to	update	the	methodology	used	to	calculate	the	size	of	the	reserve	for	each	
auction.		
The	British	case	was	less	problematic	in	the	Commissions	eyes	and	it	was	approved	
following	a	one	month	preliminary	investigation,	deemed	not	to	require	a	more	lengthy	
formal	investigation27.	One	point	of	note	was	the	UK	government	committed	to	allow	non-
domestic	capacity	to	be	able	to	benefit	from	capacity	contracts.	This	was	not	to	be	the	case	
in	the	first	capacity	auction	as	interconnector	flows	were	to	be	valued	implicitly,	i.e.	
incorporated	into	the	demand	curve	for	the	capacity	auction	based	on	historical	trends	and	
statistical	analysis	of	flows	under	different	scenarios.	The	Commission	raised	this	as	a	point	
of	concern	which	was	discussed	at	length	during	the	pre-notification	stage	of	the	state-aid	
assessment.	DECC	asked	for	more	time	to	assess	the	technical	feasibility	of	opening	up	the	
market,	given	uncertainty	about	interconnector	flows	under	different	conditions	and	other	
effects,	for	example,	how	the	obligation	to	provide	energy	at	certain	times	might	distort	
neighbouring	markets.	They	committed	to	ensuring	that	subsequent	auctions	would	value	
																																																						
24	Lausitz	in	East	Germany,	the	Rhine	area	and	Helmsted	in	Lower	Saxony	
25	https://www.euractiv.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2018/09/Capacity_Mechanisms-Media_Briefing-
Greenpeace_20180913.pdf	(visited	on	19.2.19)	
26	https://www.euractiv.com/section/electricity/news/eu-hammers-deal-on-coal-phase-out-with-special-
polish-clause/	(visited	on	19.2.19)	
27	State	aid	SA.35980:	http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/253240/253240_1579271_165_2.pdf	
non-domestic	capacity	explicitly	i.e.	it	could	bid	into	the	auction	if	judged	to	be	capable	of	
physical	delivery	and	subject	to	the	same	penalties	as	domestic	providers	if	obligations	are	
not	met.		
Detailed	analysis	of	the	operation	of	the	GB	capacity	market	since	its	introduction	in	2014	is	
beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper	(see:	IPPR,	2016),	but	in	this	case	we	can	see	how	the	CRM	
has	been	shaped	by	the	technology	politics	of	transition.	The	first	auctions	for	the	main	
component	of	the	capacity	market	-	a	T-4	auction	-	took	place	in	December	2014,	with	the	
commencement	of	obligations	on	successful	bidders	in	the	winter	of	2018.	The	price	of	
£19.40/Kw	was	lower	than	expectations,	while	the	most	recent	T-4	auction	in	2017/18	has	
seen	prices	fall	to	£8.40/Kw.	It	appears	that	the	optimistic	demand	projections	upon	which	
the	original	CM	was	based	have	proved	the	doubters	correct;	Lockwood	notes	that	‘both	
industry	and	government	modelling	assumed	a	steady	growth	in	demand	through	to	the	
2020s	at	around	2%	a	year,	but	in	fact	demand	since	2010	has	fallen	by	almost	8%’28.	
Since	its	introduction	in	2014	the	capacity	market	in	GB	has	become	politicised	with	respect	
to	the	eligibility	criteria	for	different	forms	of	capacity	in	the	auctions.	Surprising	many	
observers,	following	the	second	auction	in	2015	it	became	clear	that	small	scale	diesel	
generators	were	emerging	as	winners,	with	650	MW	being	awarded	the	lucrative	15	year	
contracts	for	new	plant	construction,	with	CCGTs	winning	none.	A	key	reason	cited	for	the	
success	of	these	more	polluting	diesel	plants	was	their	connection	to	the	lower	voltage	
distribution	networks	which	meant	that	they	could	access	additional	sources	of	revenue	
because	of	their	ability	to	help	suppliers	reduce	the	burden	they	place	on	the	transmission	
network	at	pre-defined	peak	demand	periods	(Triads),	thus	reducing	their	network	
charges29.		
Overall	the	first	two	auctions	saw	most	of	the	contracts	being	awarded	to	existing	sources	
of	capacity30.	In	response	to	this	outcome	government	proposed	changes	to	environmental	
legislation,	closed	a	number	of	tax	loopholes	and	altered	the	capacity	market	rules	in	a	way	
which	made	it	more	difficult	for	diesel	generators	to	win	contracts.	Also,	for	the	2016	
auction	they	increased	the	target	capacity	to	54	GW	–	46	GW	was	procured	in	the	2015	
auction	–	firstly	as	a	means	of	creating	demand	for	new	gas	plant,	and	secondly	in	an	effort	
to	incentivise	investment	in	alternative	sources	of	capacity,	particularly	battery	storage	and	
demand	side	response31.	Subsequent	auctions	have	seen	interconnector	capacity	prove	
increasingly	successful32,	leading	to	a	push-back	by	some	domestic	generators.	Recently,	a	
																																																						
28	http://projects.exeter.ac.uk/igov/new-thinking-the-capacity-market-how-did-we-get-here/			
29	These	additional	sources	of	revenue	are	known	as	‘embedded	benefits’.	‘It	is	thought	that	distribution-
connected	generators	now	derive	between	20%	and	50%	of	their	revenue	from	these	embedded	benefits’	
(Howard	and	Bengherbi,	2016:	p.	62).	Following	criticisms	the	energy	regulator	consulted	on	the	matter	and	
has	proposed	a	number	of	reforms	on	the	basis	that	embedded	benefits	are	distorting	the	market:	
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/decision-industry-proposals-cmp264-and-cmp265-
change-electricity-transmission-charging-arrangements-embedded-generators	(accessed	27.7.27).	The	issue	is	
extremely	complex	and	cannot	be	discussed	further	in	this	paper.	
30	IPPR	analyzed	the	outcomes	of	the	2014	and	2015	auctions	and	estimated	that	the	cost	of	contracts	for	
capacity	delivery	in	2019/20	were	£851m	for	existing	capacity	and	£90m	for	new	capacity	(IPPR,	2016:	p.	16).	
31	Slightly	over	1.8	GW	of	new	gas	plant,	501	MW	battery	storage	was	awarded	15-year	contracts	in	2016.	DSR	
did	not	qualify	for	15-year	contracts	but	1.5	GW	was	awarded	one-year	contracts.	For	an	overview	of	the	2016	
auction	results	see	(Sandbag,	2016).	
32	Making	up	over	5%	of	overall	capacity	in	the	market.	
https://www.emrdeliverybody.com/Capacity%20Markets%20Document%20Library/Provisional%20T-
4%20Results%20DY%202021-22.pdf				
number	of	them	funded	a	consultancy	report	which	criticised	as	unrealistic	and	overly	
optimistic	assumptions	about	the	reliability	of	interconnectors	(Aurora,	2018)33.		
The	most	recent,	and	surprising,	development	has	resulted	in	the	capacity	market	being	
suspended	in	late	2018	due	to	a	controversy	about	the	eligibility	of	DSR	to	access	auctions	
for	long	term	(15	year)	capacity	contracts.	Under	the	original	market	rules	DSR	was	part	of	
‘Transitional	Arrangements’	under	which	they	had	a	choice	to	either	bid	into	a	DSR-specific	
auction	or	the	main	auction	and	compete	against	conventional	capacity.	DSR	at	the	outset	
was	only	permitted	to	be	awarded	one-year	contracts	under	the	capacity	market,	not	for	3	
or	15	years	as	available	to	conventional	generators,	interconnectors	and	storage	operators.	
This	was	on	the	basis	that	DSR	did	not	involve	the	same	level	of	fixed	costs	and	as	such	did	
not	suffer	from	the	missing	money	problem.	A	small	scale	DSR	provider	challenged	this,	
taking	a	case	to	the	ECJ,	and	following	a	protracted	legal	case	the	court	ruled	in	November	
2018	that	the	market	be	suspended,	pending	a	review	by	the	Commission34.	In	effect	the	
Commission	needs	to	review	its	earlier	decision	in	2014	to	approve	the	capacity	market	and	
provide	a	better	justification	for	excluding	DSR.	Until	this	time,	payments	to	capacity	
providers	will	be	to	be	suspended;	with	over	£5.5bn	has	being	awarded	to	date.	At	the	time	
of	writing	the	Department	for	Business,	Energy	and	Industrial	Strategy	(BEIS)	–	responsible	
for	energy	policy	following	the	dissolution	of	DECC	in	2016	–	have	made	a	statement	to	the	
effect	that	this	is	a	matter	of	providing	clarification	to	the	ECJ	rather	than	a	fundamental	
rethinking	of	the	scheme35.	Whether	this	is	the	case	and	payments	can	be	swiftly	resumed,	
or	whether	a	longer	investigation	over	many	months	and	potentially	amendments	to	the	
design	of	the	CRM	will	be	required	remains	unclear.			
5 Conclusions	
As	low	carbon	transitions	advance	in	leading	countries	and	the	need	to	integrate	
renewables	into	existing	systems	comes	to	the	fore,	the	categorisation	of	energy	transition	
policies	as	either	supporting	emerging	sustainable	technologies	or	the	phase-out	of	fossil	
fuels	will	become	less	relevant.	As	we	have	shown,	CRMs	are	examples	of	government	
interventions	which	are	somewhat	ambiguous	in	this	respect;	they	can	be	framed	as	
mechanisms	to	subsidise	uneconomic	and	polluting	thermal	power	plants,	or	as	a	crucial	
bridge	between	the	fossil-fuel	and	low	carbon	energy	regimes.		
Through	the	analysis	of	the	Britain	and	Germany,	where	CRMs	have	been	introduced	in	
recent	years,	we	have	shown	that	the	politics	of	electricity	market	reform	is	being	shaped	
around	the	ambiguities	of	CRMs.	The	paper	analysed	two	specific	areas	of	ambiguity	and	
politicisation:	Firstly,	how	actors	justify	or	argue	against	the	introduction	of	CRMs,	and	
secondly,	how	actors	seek	to	influence	their	design	in	such	a	way	as	to	favour	particular	
technologies.	While	these	debates	were	informed	and	influenced	by	different	theoretical	
																																																						
33		These	assumptions	are	built	into	de-rating	factors	which	are	assigned	to	different	sources	of	capacity	based	
on	their	ability	to	be	available	during	times	of	system	need.	For	an	extensive	technical	discussion	see	(Panel	of	
Technical	Experts,	2017).	A	particular	issue	discussed	here	the	use	of	historical	data	for	interconnectors	and	
the	need	for	probabilistic	assessments	based	on	more	sophisticated	model-based	analysis.	
34	ECJ	ruling	in	favor	of	Tempus	energy:	Judgment	in	Case	T-793/14:	
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2018-11/cp180178en.pdf	(press	release).	
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=207792&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode
=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1430154	(full	judgment)	
35	https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/electricity-market-reform-capacity-market	(accessed	on	
19.2.19)	
arguments	about	market	design	and	economic	efficiency,	we	observe	that	the	processes	of	
market	reform	around	the	electricity	capacity	issue	are	being	strongly	influenced	by	political	
factors	specific	to	each	country	context.		
Although	CRMs	are	interventions	which	have	not	been	designed	at	the	outset	with	the	
specific	intention	of	supporting	low	carbon	technologies	or	the	phase-out	incumbent	forms	
of	energy,	the	analysis	is	relevant	to	wider	debates	about	the	politics	of	low	carbon	energy	
transitions.	CRMs	can	be	designed	in	particular	ways	to	prioritise	and	exclude	certain	forms	
of	capacity	and	will	thus	have	a	significant	influence	on	the	energy	mix	in	countries	where	
they	are	implemented.	However,	we	have	also	shown	how,	once	implemented,	they	are	not	
static	and	do	not	necessarily	produce	the	effects	intentioned	by	their	designers.	Rather,	
they	are	subject	to	political	influence	as	they	co-evolve	with	the	technical	dynamics	of	the	
complex	energy	system	and	other	segments	of	the	electricity	market.	
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